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	 “The	Dreadful	Chasm”:	American	Recognition	and	Response	to	the	Armenian	Genocide	of	1915-1916	and	the	Holocaust		Erin	Chapman			 “What	is	to	be	done?	Is	humanity	so	situated	as	to	see	deliberate	murder	committed?	And	on	such	a	scale?		 Ambassador	Morgenthau	is	recorded	as	having	done	his	upmost	to	stave	off	such	happenings,	but	without	avail,	and	if	America	cannot	extend	a	helping	hand	no	one	else	can	at	present…the	only	means	of	rescue	is	[the	women	and	children’s]	transportation	to	this	or	some	other	country.	Efforts	at	relief	are	being	made	by	various	Armenian	sources,	but	they	are	wholly	inadequate.	Even	the	removal	of	a	part	of	the	Armenians	is	such	a	great	undertaking	that	it	requires	the	best	efforts	of	a	powerful	nation	like	America	and	the	active	cooperation	of	the	government…But	why	not	give	it?	Why	not	give	the	power	and	the	work	necessary	for	such	work?	The	opportunity	to	do	such	service	as	can	be	rendered	at	present	does	not	come	but	once	in	the	history	of	a	nation.”		 	 	
-Vincent	Yardum	to	the	editor	of	The	New	York	Times	on	“The	Death	of	Armenia”,	September	17,	19151			 The	opportunity	that	Vincent	Yardum	wrote	about	in	1915	presented	itself	to	the	United	States	not	once	but	twice	in	its	history.	During	the	Armenian	Genocide	of	1915-196	and	the	Holocaust,	America	stood	in	a	position	that	gave	it	more	latitude	for	intervention	than	most	countries	at	the	time.	Yet,	in	responding	to	the	genocide	of	the	Ottoman	Armenians	and	the	European	Jews,	American	leaders	placed	practical	considerations	above	humanitarian	concerns.	In	1944	Dr.	Israel	Goldstein																																																									1	VINCENT	YARDUM.	1915.	THE	DEATH	OF	ARMENIA	:Her	Land	Has	Been	Devastated	and	the	Few	Survivors	Driven	Out..	New	York	Times	(1857-Current	file),	September	17,		http://www.proquest.com/	(accessed	November	18,	2008).	
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criticized	this	American	pragmatism	and	challenged	Americans	to	respond	saying,	“We	ask	our	Government	in	this	supreme	hour	of	a	people’s	agony	to…see	to	it	that	the	dreadful	chasm	between	the	verbal	protest	and	actual	rescue	work	be	bridged.”2	Yet	the	“dreadful	chasm”	to	which	Goldstein	referred	was	actually	more	of	a	gap	of	understanding	that	had	yet	to	be	closed.	Although	in	both	cases	there	were	widespread	public	cries	for	American	intervention,	ideas	about	states’	sovereignty	and	the	humanitarian	responsibilities	of	nations	were	still	evolving.	Ultimately,	this	emerging	understanding	of	the	humanitarian	duties	of	bystander	nations	limited	American	intervention.	Even	though	the	State	Department	faltered	in	the	handling	of	the	Jewish	refugees,	for	the	most	part	the	American	response	to	each	atrocity	was	consistent	with	the	nation’s	military	and	economic	capabilities	and	also	with	the	intellectual	environment	of	the	time.	In	the	end,	it	was	political	pragmatism	and	this	evolving	sense	of	responsibility	that	conditioned	the	American	response	to	both	Turkey	and	Nazi	Germany	and	prevented	Americans	from	bridging	the	”dreadful	chasm”	between	recognition	and	response.			 In	order	to	understand	the	American	response	to	genocide,	one	must	first	understand	when	the	Americans	originally	learned	of	each	atrocity.	In	the	case	of	Armenia,	Americans	had	a	sense	of	the	conflict	before	it	even	began.	The	Ottoman	government	had	massacred	100,000	Armenians	between	1894-1896,	and	20,000	
																																																								2	Special	to	THE	NEW	YORK	TIMES.	"ZIONISTS	APPEAL	FOR	JEWS	IN	EUROPE	:Dr.	Goldstein	Asks	the	United	States	to	Extend	Temporary	Havens	at	Once."	New	York	Times	(1857-Current	file),		July	10,	1944,		http://www.proquest.com/	(accessed	December	10,	2008).	
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Armenians	in	1909.3	Both	of	these	episodes	were	well	covered	in	the	American	media,	and	both	American	leaders	and	the	public	had	a	strong	awareness	of	the	Armenian	cause.		American	officials	in	Turkey	were	also	attuned	to	the	growing	tensions.		On	August	27,	1914	The	Daily	Telegraph,	a	London	publication,	ran	a	story	about	American	Ambassador	to	Turkey,	Henry	Morgenthau,	Sr.’s	warning	to	the	American	State	Department	about	the	mounting	danger	for	the	Armenians.	Also,	a	December	14,	1914	New	York	Times	piece	told	of	Turkish	impositions	on	the	Armenians.	The	article	said,	“Three	hundred	thousand	Turkish	troops	are	mobilized	at	Erezeram.	Hundreds	of	Armenians	have	been	imprisoned	and	many	hanged	in	the	streets,	without	trial,	as	examples.”4	Because	of	stories	like	these,	knowledge	of	the	Armenian	plight	pervaded	the	consciousness	of	typical	Americans,	and	in	1914	public	opinion	remained	decidedly	anxious	about	the	reports	from	Smyrma	predicting	catastrophe.5		Between	March	and	April	1915	the	Ottoman	Turks	began	slaughtering	Armenians	in	the	Anatolia	peninsula.	The	New	York	Times	picked	up	the	story	almost	immediately,	and	they	ran	a	page	four	article	about	the	massacred	men,	women	and	children	on	March	20,	1915.	The	story	entitled	Whole	Plain	Strewn	by	
Armenian	Bodies	included	an	Armenian	doctor	name	Derderian’s	description	of	an																																																									3		Sir	Martin	Gilbert,	Twentieth-century	genocides	in	America	and	the	Armenian	
Genocide	of	1915,	Jay	Winter,		(Cambridge:	Cambridge	University	Press,	2003),	9,	13.	4	HANG	CHRISTIANS	IN	STREET	:Armenians'	Position	at	Erzerum	Is	Very	Precarious..	1914.	New	York	Times	(1857-Current	file),	December	14,		http://www.proquest.com/	(accessed	November	15,	2008).	5	Simon	Payaslian,	The	United	States	Response	to	the	Armenian	Genocide,	in	Looking	
Back	Moving	Forward:	Confronting	the	Armenian	Genocide,	ed.	Richard	G.	Hovannisian,	(New	Brunswick:	Transaction	Publishers,	2003),	55-57.	
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entire	field	covered	with	civilian	bodies6.	Three	more	articles	depicting	the	atrocities	ran	in	March	and	April	of	19157,	and	on	May	1	the	story	made	the	front	page	of	the	Times.		In	Kurds	Renew	Massacres	The	New	York	Times	chronicled	how	the	Kurds	and	the	Turks	had	escalated	violence	in	the	entire	district	of	Lake	Van.	With	such	prominent	coverage	reaching	Americans	less	than	a	month	after	the	massacres	began,	there	can	be	little	doubt	that	the	American	people	were	aware	of	the	deaths	in	Armenia.		The	information	had	also	reached	the	American	government.	On	June	30,	1915	Henry	Morgenthau	received	a	dispatch	from	Consul	Leslie	Davis	describing	the	mass	murder	that	had	been	occurring	in	his	region8.	Within	two	months	the	Americans	in	Turkey	understood	what	was	happening,	and	the	leadership	in	Washington	became	aware	soon	after	that.	In	an	October	1,	1915	letter	to	President	Woodrow	Wilson,	Colonel	House	not	only	mentions	the	Turkish	matter,	but	he	goes																																																									6	WHOLE	PLAIN	STREWN	BY	ARMENIAN	BODIES	:Turks	and	Kurds	Reported	to	Have	Massacred	Men,	Women	and	Children..	1915.	New	York	Times	(1857-Current	file),	March	20,		http://www.proquest.com/	(accessed	November	20,	2008).	7	POLAND,	SERBIA,	ARMENIA.	1915.	New	York	Times	(1857-Current	file),	March	25,		http://www.proquest.com/	(accessed	November	20,	2008).	;	KURDS	DISGUST	THE	TURKS	:The	Latter	Protest	Against	the	Atrocities	of	the	Former..	1915.	New	York	Times	(1857-Current	file),	April	18,		http://www.proquest.com/	(accessed	November	20,	2008).;	KURDS	MASSACRE	MORE	ARMENIANS	:All	Inhabitants	in	Ten	Villages	Near	Van	Said	to	Have	Been	Killed.	APPEAL	SENT	TO	WILSON	By	Head	of	Church	--	Evidences	of	Fearful	Outrages	Seen	in	Deserted	Settlements.	STORY	OF	GREAT	EXODUS	Flight	from	Persia	Full	of	Suffering	for	Thousands	Who	Escaped	the	Sword..	1915.	New	York	Times	(1857-Current	file),	April	26,		http://www.proquest.com/	(accessed	November	20,	2008).	8	Peter	Balakian,		From	Ezra	Pound	to	Theodore	Roosevelt:	American	intellectual	and	
cultural	responses	to	the	Armenian	Genocide	in	Twentieth-century	genocides	in	
America	and	the	Armenian	Genocide	of	1915,	Jay	Winter,		(Cambridge:	Cambridge	University	Press,	2003),	243-244.	
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so	far	as	to	dub	it	a	“massacre”	saying,	“	I	am	wondering	whether	this	government	should	not	make	some	sort	of	protest	over	the	Armenian	massacres.”		Wilson	put	the	issues	on	the	radar	when	he	mentioned	the	matter	in	a	1916	speech	in	Cincinnati.9	There	can	be	no	doubt,	that	throughout	the	course	of	the	killings,	both	the	Washington	officials	and	the	American	people	remained	cognizant	of	the	atrocities	occurring	in	Armenia.			 The	question	of	recognition	of	the	Jewish	Holocaust	proves	more	difficult.	Unlike,	in	the	Armenian	case,	the	Nazi	extermination	of	European	Jews	began	without	antecedents,	and	the	Nazis	took	better	care	to	conceal	their	efforts	than	did	their	Ottoman	counterparts.	Yet,	news	of	the	systematic	killing	of	Jews	gradually	crossed	the	Atlantic.	By	1942,	the	American	leadership	had	been	informed	of	the	murders	in	Europe.	Undersecretary	of	State,	Sumner	Wells	announced	on	November	24,	1942	that	2	million	Jewish	civilians	had	been	massacred,	and	a	month	later,	The	
New	York	Times	covered	the	mass	murder	of	Jews	in	Galicia.		A	number	of	other	American	newspapers	covered	the	story	of	the	March	1942	Press	Conference	where	the	American	Jewish	Joint	Distribution	Committee	estimated	that	240,000	Jews	had	been	slaughtered	in	the	Ukraine.	In	addition,	in	June	of	1942,	American	newspapers	reported	that	700,000	Jews	in	Poland	had	been	killed	at	the	hands	of	the	Nazis10.		By	
																																																								9	John	Milton	Cooper,	Jr.	A	Friend	in	power?	Woodrow	Wilson	and	Armenia,		in	
Twentieth-century	genocides	in	America	and	the	Armenian	Genocide	of	1915,	Jay	Winter,		(Cambridge:	Cambridge	University	Press,	2003),	104		10	David	S.	Wyman,	and	Rafael	Medoff.	A	Race	Against	Death:	Peter	Bergson,		
America,	and	the	Holocaust,	(New	York:	The	New	Press,	2002)	28-29		
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1942	American	leaders	and	the	public	had	been	repeatedly	exposed	to	the	reality	of	Nazi	exterminations.			 Even	as	the	knowledge	of	genocide	spreads,	the	question	remains:	at	the	time	did	Americans	understand	completely	what	was	happening?	Did	they	have	a	framework	for	understanding	what	the	mass	killings	meant?	In	terms	of	Armenia,	it	is	likely	that	they	had	some	sense	of	the	significance.	The	two	episodes	of	mass	murder	had	accustomed	Americans	to	the	violence	of	the	Turks,	yet	the	previous	incidents	had	been	extended	acts	of	violence	and	not	a	premeditated	attempt	at	extermination.	The	killings	between	1915-1916	represented	the	Turkish	government’s	attempt	to	annihilate	the	race	of	Christians	in	the	Anatolian	peninsula,	and	it	is	difficult	to	tell	if	Americans	at	the	time	understood	the	distinction,11	yet	the	newspaper	coverage	of	the	time	picked	up	on	this	difference.	An	August	6,	1915	New	
York	Times	article	described	the	1915	atrocities	as	of	a	new	caliber	of	destruction.	It	claimed	that	the	“terrible	scale	of	these	massacres”	was	“greater	than	any	which	occurred	under	Abdul	Hamid.”12	In	addition,	the	Armenian	genocide	is	often	considered	the	first	genocide	of	the	modern	era,	and	without	any	previous	episodes	to	compare	it	to,	it	is	often	argued	that	Americans	viewed	the	killings	as	internal	uprisings	resulting	from	an	oppressive	government.	Moreover,	in	1915	Americans’	understanding	was	curtailed																																																									11	Yehuda	Bauer,	Comparison	of	Genocides,	in	Studies	in	Comparative	Genocide,	Levon	Chorbajian,	ed.	and	George	Shirinian,	ed.	(New	York:	St.	Martin’s	Press,	Inc.,	1999),	36-37.	12	Special	Cable	to	THE	NEW	YORK	TIMES.	1915.	ARMENIAN	HORRORS	GROW	:Massacres	Greater	Than	Under	Abdul	Hamid,	London	Paper	Says.	New	York	Times	(1857-Current	file),	August	6,		http://www.proquest.com/	(accessed	November	20,	2008).		
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by	the	fact	that	the	word	genocide	had	not	even	been	coined	yet.	Thirty-three	years	before	the	UN	charter	established	a	definition	of	genocide,	expressing	the	full	magnitude	of	the	destruction	proved	difficult.	Armenian	poet,	Avetik	Isahakian	captured	this	when	he	wrote,	“There	are	no	words	in	the	dictionaries	to	describe	the	hideousness	of	the	terrors.”13		The	emergence	of	a	new	scope	of	mass	killing	complicates	the	understanding	of	the	American	response,	because	although	it	is	certain	that	Americans	and	their	leaders	were	aware	of	the	events	taking	place	in	Anatolia,	it	is	difficult	to	know	if	they	recognized	the	magnitude	of	what	was	unfolding.		Yet,	the	newspaper	coverage	at	the	time	seems	to	indicate	that	people	viewed	the	Ottoman	episode	as	a	new	level	of	destruction.	In	the	September	25’s	
Says	Extinction	Menaces	Armenia	Nubar	Pasha	demonstrates	a	perception	of	the	Armenian	events	that	resembles	the	modern	definition	of	genocide.	The	New	York	
Times	quoted	him	as	saying,	“What	has	occurred	during	the	last	few	months	in	Cilicia	and	Armenia	is	unbelievable.	It	is	nothing	more	or	less	than	the	annihilation	of	a	whole	people.”	Later	on	in	the	article	another	Armenian	wrote	in	a	letter,	“Christian	martyrdom	has	at	no	time	assumed	such	colossal	proportions.”14	Although,	the	word	genocide	had	not	yet	entered	into	the	collective	vocabulary,	writers	and	readers	at	the	time	most	certainly	had	a	sense	that	the	events	in	Armenia	were	different	from	previous	episodes	of	murder.																																																										13	Gilbert	in	Winter,	15-16	14	SAYS	EXTINCTION	MENACES	ARMENIA:	Dr.	Gabriel	Tells	of	More	Than	450,000	Killed	in	Recent	Massacres.	600,000	DRIVEN	INTO	EXILE	Unless	Neutral	Powers	Intervene,	Says	Nubar	Pasha,	Almost	the	Whole	People	Is	Doomed..	1915.	New	York	Times	(1857-Current	file),	September	25,		http://www.proquest.com/	(accessed	November	20,	2008).	
“The	Dreadful	Chasm”	
	
8	
The	same	problem	persists	in	trying	to	decipher	Americans’	reaction	to	the	Holocaust.	Although	it	is	clear	that	both	national	leaders	and	many	average	Americans	were	aware	of	the	Jewish	death	tolls	by	the	end	of	1942,	it	is	not	clear	if	they	recognized	the	sheer	scope	of	what	was	happening.		In	his	analysis	of	the	American	response	Thomas	W.	Lacquer	distinguishes	between	“knowing”	and	understanding.”	He	writes	of	how	although	a	person	can	be	exposed	to	information	repeatedly,	that	does	not	necessarily	mean	that	they	have	internalized	it,	or	that	they	understand	its	ramifications.15	This	difference	between	knowledge	and	understanding	was	evidenced	in	the	pervasive	doubts	Americans	garnered	about	Jewish	exaggeration.	Doubts	about	Jewish	exaggeration	of	Auschwitz	reports	persisted	into	1945,	and	even	high-ranking	government	officials	put	stock	in	the	existence	of	Jewish	exaggerations.	Henry	Morgenthau	Jr.,	Roosevelt’s	Jewish	Secretary	of	the	Treasury	addressed	to	Secretary	of	War	Oswald	Shultz’s	doubts	about	Jewish	exaggeration	in	a	letter	of	December	1944.	Morgenthau	wrote:	I	understand	fully	your	skepticism	concerning	atrocity	stories…I	regret	to	state,	however,	that	the	evidence	supporting	these	accounts	is	all,	too	abundant.16	Consequently,	even	though	the	American	public	was	aware	of	the	Holocaust	by	1943,	there	remains	doubt	as	to	whether	or	not	this	actually	meant	that	it	was	in	a	position	to	respond.			 It	is	also	important	to	understand	whether	or	not	the	United	States	felt	that	it	had	an	obligation	to	intervene	in	each	case.	Although	today	intervention	might	be																																																									15	Tony	Kushner,	Different	Worlds:	British	perceptions	of	the	Final	Solution	During	the	
Second	World	War”	in	The	Final	Solution:	Origins	and	Implementations,	David	Cesarani,	(New	York:	Routledge,	1994),	248		16	U.S.	Congress,	Senate	Judiciary	Committee,	Morgenthau	Diary	(Germay)	1,	809	
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perceived	as	the	appropriate	response,	one	must	consider	how	the	United	States	at	the	time	viewed	its	relationship	to	the	rest	of	the	world,	and	whether	or	not	it	understood	itself	to	be	obliged	to	aid	those	countries.	In	Armenia,	military	intervention	was	not	seriously	considered.		In	1915	the	United	States	remained	staunchly	isolationist,	and	saw	its	national	interests	to	be	entirely	separate	from	those	of	Europe	and	the	rest	of	the	world.	Although,	World	War	I	would	change	these	perceptions	drastically,	when	genocide	broke	out	in	Armenia,	the	United	States	consequently	did	not	consider	military	intervention17.	Moreover,	even	if	the	United	States	had	seen	Armenian	intervention	as	necessary	they	were	in	no	place	to	offer	assistance.	Their	peacetime	army	was	not	ready	to	be	mobilized,	and	as	Morgenthau	noted	in	a	letter	to	Secretary	of	State,	ending	the	conflict	would	require	a	force	that	“…the	United	States	are	not	in	a	position	to	exert.”	18		State	Department	officials	echoed	this	sentiment	in	their	October	16,	1915	statement	to	representative	John	J.	Eagan	of	New	Jersey.	The	State	Department	maintained	that	beyond	using	Morgenthau	as	a	mouthpiece	and	warning	the	Turks	of	their	decline	in	American	popular	opinion,	they	could	do	nothing	more	to	help	the	Armenian	cause.	19		 Nevertheless,	many	called	for	American	diplomatic	intervention.		Viscount	Bryce	of	the	United	Kingdom	thought	that	The	United	States	might	be	able	to	stop	the	murders	by	persuading	Germany	to	act.	He	urged	American	policy	makers	to	intervene:																																																									17	Winter,	2.	18	Payaslian	in	Hovannisian,	64.	19	WE	CAN	DO	NOTHING	FURTHER	:View	of	State	Department	as	to	Action	Regarding	Armenia..	1915.	New	York	Times	(1857-Current	file),	October	16,		http://www.proquest.com/	(accessed	November	14,	2008).	
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The	civilized	world,	especially	America	ought	to	know	what	horrors	have	been	passing	in	Asiatic	Turkey	during	the	last	few	months,	for	if	anything	can	stop	the	destroying	hand	of	the	Turkish	government	it	will	be	an	expression	of	the	opinion	of	neutral	nations,	chiefly	the	judgment	of	humane	America.20		Ultimately	the	United	States	wielded	little	power	to	influence	Germany,	and	American	intervention	of	this	sort	was	never	seriously	pursued.			 The	question	of	international	obligation	during	the	Holocaust	differed	from	Armenia.	By	1942	the	United	States’	role	in	geopolitics	had	changed.	Intervening	in	European	politics	was	no	longer	taboo,	and	the	attack	on	Pearl	Harbor	had	ended	any	lingering	hopes	for	isolationism.	Yet,	by	the	time	the	extermination	of	the	Jews	was	made	known	to	American	leaders,	their	scope	for	intervention	was	limited.21	Franklin	Roosevelt	found	himself	enmeshed	in	a	global	war	with	few	resources	to	divert	to	a	rescue	effort.	Although	rescue	was	suggested,	“rescue	through	victory”	became	the	official	mantra	of	the	Roosevelt	administration.22		 The	American	policy	makers	responded	to	the	genocides	in	Armenia	and	Nazi	Germany	according	to	the	ideologies	and	constraints	of	the	time	period.	Although,	military	intervention	was	never	seriously	considered,	the	Americans	still	responded	in	part	to	the	destruction	of	the	Armenians.	Immediately	after	he	became	aware	of	the	atrocities	Henry	Morgenthau	met	with	German	overlord,	Wagenheim																																																									20	BRYCE	ASKS	US	TO	AID	ARMENIA	:Says	That	All	the	Christians	in	Trebizond,	Numbering	10,000,	Were	Drowned.	WOMEN	SEIZED	FOR	HAREMS	Only	Power	That	Can	Stop	the	Massacres	Is	Germany,	and	We	Might	Persuade	Her	to	Act..	1915.	New	York	Times	(1857-Current	file),	September	21,		http://www.proquest.com/	(accessed	November	20,	2008).	21	William	D.	Rubinstein,	The	Myth	of	Rescue:	Why	the	democracies	could	not	have	
saved	more	Jews	from	the	Nazis	(New	York:	Routledge,	1997),	212	22	David	S.	Wyman,	The	Abandonment	of	the	Jews:	America	and	the	Holocaust	1941-	
1945,		(New	York:	Pantheon	Books,	1984),	312	
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to	convince	him	to	intervene	on	behalf	of	the	Armenians,	or	to	at	least	put	pressure	on	his	Turkish	allies.		Wagenheim	and	the	Germans	refused,	and	Morgenthau	was	left	in	the	frustrating	position	of	being	forced	to	bear	witness	to	an	atrocity,	with	little	ability	to	intercede.23		Morgenthau	was	constrained	by	his	position	as	ambassador	to	not	intervene	personally	on	behalf	of	the	Armenians.24	His	duty	lay	solely	in	protecting	Americans	and	American	interests	in	Turkey,	and	he	had	little	scope	to	intervene	in	what	he	perceived	to	be	the	internal	affairs	of	another	country.”25	Unable	to	do	anything	on	the	ground,	Morgenthau	turned	to	making	appeals	to	Washington.	He	made	three	recommendations	for	American	intervention.	First,	he	proposed	that	the	United	States	make	a	direct	appeal	to	the	Turks	on	a	humanitarian	basis.	He	also	suggested	that	Wilson	make	a	formal	appeal	to	the	emperor	of	Germany.	Finally,	he	argued	for	a	U.S.	movement	to	open	channels	to	Armenian	refugees.	Morgenthau	did	not	receive	a	response	for	two	months,	at	which	time	Secretary	of	State	Robert	Lansing	responded	by	saying,	“However	much	we	may	deplore	the	suffering	of	the	Armenians	we	cannot	take	active	steps	to	come	to	their	assistance	at	the	present	time.”26		Although	American	officials	channeled	little	energy	into	the	Armenian	cause,	the	American	people	took	to	raising	money	for	the	relief	effort.		Galvanized	by	the																																																									23,	Henry	Morgenthau	III,	Mostly	Morgentaus:	A	Family	History	(New	York:	Ticknor	&		Fields,	1991),	167	24	Henry	Morgentha,	Sr.,	Ambassador	Mogenthau’s	Story,	(New	York:	Doubleday,	Page	&	Company,	1919),	328-329		25	Morgenthau	III,	169	26	Morgenthau	III,	170	
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frequent	press	coverage,	Americans	made	donations	to	the	Armenian	cause	in	record	numbers.27	By	1920	American	philanthropists	had	donated	a	staggering	$120	million	to	the	Near	East	Relief	effort.28	The	efforts	of	the	American	people	proved	that	although,	intervention	was	not	necessarily	the	course	of	action	that	the	government	viewed	as	appropriate,	humanitarian	concerns	remained	important	to	the	American	public.		The	American	response	to	the	Holocaust	was	similarly	passive.		The	United	States’	failure	to	take	an	active	role	in	aiding	European	Jews	even	before	the	Nazis	began	systematic	extermination.	First,	American	immigration	policies	prevented	thousands	of	Jews	from	taking	refuge	in	America.	The	Russian	Revolution	and	World	War	I	heightened	Americans’	fears	of	foreigners	and	fostered	a	sense	of	nativism.	These	fears	helped	to	usher	in	the	Immigration	Act	of	1924,	which	effectively	closed	America’s	doors	to	thousands	of	foreigners.29	This	was	compounded	when	the	Great	Depression	made	Americans	wary	of	foreigners	taking	American	jobs,	and	consequently,	Americans	failed	to	respond	to	the	loss	of	Jewish	rights.	Before	the	atrocities	even	began,	American	leaders	and	particularly	Jewish	groups	largely	failed	to	take	notice	of	German	regulations	regarding	Jews30.		Beyond	restrictive	quotas,	the	United	States	State	Department	made	immigration	excessively	difficult	during	the	1930s	and	1940s	and	as	a	result																																																									27	Dickran	H.	Boyajian,		Armenia:	The	Case	for	a	Forgotten	Genocide,	(Westwood,	New	Jersey:	Educational	Book	Crafters,	1972)	148	28	Balakian	in	Winter,	253	29	Wyman	&	Medoff,	1-3	30	Helen	Fein,		Accounting	for	Genocide:	National	Responses	and	Jewish		
Victimization	during	the	Holocaust,	(Chicago:	University	of	Chicago	Press,		1979),	166		
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condemned	many	Jews	to	remain	in	Nazi	Germany.	Despite	the	fact	that	it	received	more	than	enough	applications	to	fill	the	German	quota31,	the	State	Department	only	filled	enough	visas	to	accommodate	ten	percent	of	the	quota.32	Moreover,	the	State	Department	made	it	particularly	difficult	for	German	Jews	procure	visas	by	enforcing	certain	unreasonable	regulations.	For	example,	in	order	to	obtain	a	visa	to	travel	to	the	United	States,	a	German	Jew	was	required	by	American	law	to	obtain	a	recommendation	letter	from	their	local	police	station—which	often	meant	that	in	order	to	be	granted	asylum	in	America,	Jews	first	had	to	be	recommended	by	the	local	Gestapo.	33		In	addition,	throughout	the	duration	of	the	war	the	State	Department	continued	to	refer	to	German	Jews	as	“political	refugees.”	This	label	failed	to	capture	the	specific	threat	facing	the	Jews,	and	it	prevented	them	from	receiving	special	immigration	consideration.	In	1943	the	Emergency	Committee	to	Save	the	Jewish	People	of	Europe	argued	for	a	change	in	the	way	that	the	State	Department	classified	Jews.	The	State	Department	denied	this	request.34	Moreover,	in	the	three	and	a	half	years	that	America	was	engaged	in	World	War	II,	only	21,000	refugees	were	allowed	to	enter	the	United	States—a	staggering	one	tenth	of	what	the	State	Department	quotas	allowed.	The	State	Department	and	Breckinridge	Long	refused,	and	in	doing	so	prevented	yet	another	channel	for	American	intervention	on	behalf	of	the	European	Jews.35																																																										31	Fein,	167	32	Wyman	&	Medoff,	11	33	Fein,	170	34	Fein,	173-174	35	Wyman,	313	
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The	State	Department	also	operated	for	a	while	in	a	way	that	kept	other	agencies	in	the	dark	as	to	what	was	going	on	in	Nazi	Germany.	Henry	Morgenthau,	the	Jewish	Secretary	of	the	Treasury	challenged	the	State	Department’s	inadequacy	in	early	1944.	In	response	to	a	January	13,	1944	memo	that	Morgenthau	received	entitled	“Report	to	the	Secretary	on	the	Acquiescence	of	this	Government	in	the	Murder	of	the	Jews,”	Morgenthau	requested	a	meeting	with	Roosevelt36.		The	memo	argued	that	the	State	Department,	and	particularly,	Long’s	negligence	was	resulting	in	the	destruction	of	German	Jews.	Morgenthau	and	other	members	of	the	State	Department	met	with	Roosevelt	on	Sunday	January	16,	1944	to	address	these	concerns.	In	the	meeting	Morgenthau	indicted	Long	and	his	department	for	their	“gross	procrastination”	with	regards	to	the	Jewish	matter.	37	He	argued	to	Roosevelt	that	though,	unintentionally,	the	Department’s	actions	had	stymied	the	administration’s	larger	attempts	to	help	the	Jews.	Roosevelt	was	at	first	hesitant	to	respond,	but	he	understood	that	in	an	election	year	he	could	not	afford	to	look	soft	on	the	rescue	effort,	as	public	opinion	had	decidedly	changed	from	supporting	isolation	to	showing	a	concern	for	more	widespread	intervention.38	In	this	way	Roosevelt’s	concern	for	domestic	popularity	factored	into	his	decision	to	intervene	
																																																								36	Wyman	&	Medoff,	47	37	John	Morton	Blum,	Roosevelt	and	Morgenthau:	A	Revision	and	Condensation	of	
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as	much	as	his	concern	for	the	refugees.	Nevertheless,	Roosevelt	did	take	action,	and	on	January	22,	1944	he	established	the	War	Refugee	Board.39	The	establishment	of	the	War	Refugee	Board	marked	a	turning	point	in	the	United	States’	commitment	to	the	Jewish	cause.	Although,	its	head	John	Pehle	would	later	acknowledge	that	its	efforts	were,	“little	enough;	late	and	little,”	the	board	went	further	than	any	other	American	agency	in	advancing	the	Jewish	cause.	40	The	Board	was	made	up	of	the	Secretaries	of	War,	Treasury	and	State	and	the	body	was	charged	with	taking	measures	to	prevent	the	slaughter	of	European	Jews.41	From	the	beginning	it	was	given	little	funds,	and	much	of	its	operational	expenses	eventually	came	from	private	donations42.	More	than	a	lack	of	funding	plagued	the	board.	They	began	their	charge	after	the	majority	of	the	Nazi	victims	had	already	been	killed,	and	they	faced	problems	including	differences	of	opinions	between	the	anti-interventionist	Cordell	Hull,	the	pragmatic	Henry	Stimson	and	impassioned	Morgenthau.43	Nevertheless,	the	War	Refugee	Board	was	able	to	make	significant	strides	towards	assisting	the	Jews	of	Europe.	The	Board	worked	to	establish	free	ports	in	Europe	and	brought	932	Jews	to	a	refugee	camp	in	Oswego,	New	York.44	Yet,	in	light	of	the	magnitude	of	the	Jewish	loss,	these	efforts	seem	negligible.	In	its	response	to	the	Nazi’s	attempts	to	exterminate	the	Jews	and	its	response	to	the	Armenian	genocide,	the	United	States	proved	more	effective	than	
																																																								39	Blum,	532	40	Wyman	&	Medoff,	52	41	Beschloss,	56-58	42	Wyman	&	Medoff,	53	43	Wyman,	313	44	Bescholss,	56-58	
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any	of	the	other	Allied	governments45.		Which	begs	the	question:	did	the	United	States	do	all	that	it	could	have	done	to	aid	the	Jewish	victims	of	the	Nazi	Holocaust	and	the	Armenian	genocide?	If	not,	what	factors	account	for	the	lack	of	response	and	what	could	America	have	done	better?		In	Armenia,	active	American	intervention	was	stymied	by	several	factors.	The	first	was	the	impracticality	of	American	military	intervention.	The	small,	peacetime	force	was	not	at	all	prepared	for	or	able	to	mobilize	against	a	far	off	Ottoman	aggressor.46	More	than	military	inability,	the	most	significant	factor	precluded	American	intervention	on	behalf	of	the	Armenians	remains	the	fact	that	such	a	course	of	action	was	hardly	considered	at	the	time.	Given	America’s	tradition	of	isolationism,	and	Wilson’s	commitment	to	staying	out	of	the	war,	intervention	would	have	required	a	cataclysmic	shift	in	American	policy.	In	addition,	practical	concerns	kept	the	Americans	out.	American	trade	with	Turkey	amounted	to	$6.2	million	dollars	in	the	years	leading	up	to	1915,	and	prominent	politicians	wanted	nothing	to	do	with	obstructing	Ottoman	trade.47	In	addition,	Wilson	was	enamored	with	the	idea	of	influencing	the	peace	settlement	in	Europe,	and	was	hesitant	to	undertake	any	policies	that	would	have	disrupted	his	bid	for	reelection	in	191648.		Beyond	such	domestic	concerns,	the	thinkers	of	the	time	were	not	sure	what	to	make	of	the	meaning	of	the	Armenian	genocide.	Such	a	large-scale	attempt	to	eradicate	a	group	of	people	had	little	precedents,	and	leaders																																																									45	Tony	Kushner,	The	Holocaust	and	the	Liberal	Imagination:	A	Social	and	Cultural	
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of	the	time	often	erroneously	looked	upon	the	deaths	as	a	matter	of	“domestic	policy.”	Moreover	outside	of	colonialism,	the	intervention	of	one	country	into	the	affairs	of	another	sovereign	country	had	little	pretext	in	the	early	twentieth	century;	so	intervention	would	have	been	an	unprecedented	breech	of	the	current	understanding	of	states’	rights49.		The	lack	of	active	American	intervention	in	Armenia	was	not	so	much	the	result	of	a	failure	of	conscience,	but	rather	a	failure	of	the	international	relations	ideologies	of	the	time	to	accommodate	this	new	form	of	destruction.	It	cannot	be	argued	that	America	was	disinterested,	as	the	overwhelming	amount	of	money	that	the	American	people	donated	to	the	Armenian	cause,	speaks	to	how	receptive	Americans	were	to	the	plight	of	the	Armenians.	Above	all,	they	lacked	the	proper	political	environment	and	military	tools	to	have	pursued	large-scale	intervention.		The	American	response	to	the	Holocaust	proved	a	larger	disappointment	than	the	response	to	Armenia,	but	it	can	be	similarly	understood	in	light	of	the	thinking	of	the	time.		The	emergence	of	Total	War	in	World	War	I,	and	its	extension	in	World	War	II	conditioned	how	Americans	viewed	the	numbers	surrounding	the	Jewish	disappearances,	at	least	initially.	Total	War	meant	that	for	the	first	time	the	line	between	the	battle	field	and	the	home	front	had	become	significantly	blurred.	Attacks	on	civilians	had	become	commonplace,	and	the	question	of	just	how	far	war	could	extend	into	civilian	life	was	only	beginning	to	be	understood.	In	this	way,	the	
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early	losses	of	Jews	in	the	Soviet	Union	could	have	been	understood	to	Americans	as	the	result	of	this	new,	all-encompassing	form	of	war.	50	The	pervasive	xenophobia	and	anti-Semitism	prevalent	in	pre-World	War	II	America	compounded	this	misunderstanding.	The	Great	Depression	and	later	the	fear	of	German	subversion	had	fostered	a	fear	of	immigrants	in	many	Americans.		One	telling	poll	from	the	early	1940s	reported	that	as	many	as	thirty	to	forty	percent	of	Americans	would	support	or	sympathize	with	an	American	effort	to	get	rid	of	the	Jews.51	The	idea	of	a	fifth	column	of	German	Jews	operating	in	the	United	States	to	undermine	the	war	effort,	was	pervasive,	and	this	fear	led	many	to	view	the	reported	numbers	of	Jewish	deaths	as	blatant	exaggerations52.		These	fears	were	reflected	in	the	failure	of	the	United	States	State	Department	to	accommodate	Jewish	refugees.	Of	all	of	the	failures	of	the	Americans,	the	State	Departments’	oversight	remains	the	most	prominent	example	of	how	American	inaction	directly	affected	the	Jewish	plight.	Yet,	beyond	the	State	Department	the	reaction	of	prominent	American	officials	proved	reasonable,	even	if	it	was	more	concerned	with	pragmatic	considerations	that	it	was	with	humanitarian	concerns.		Roosevelt	and	his	administration	repeatedly	failed	to	pursue	an	active	strategy	in	rescuing	the	Jews,	but	their	reluctance	stemmed	not	from	a	hatred	of	the	cause	but	in	part	from	the	pressures	of	fighting	a	war	on	two	fronts.	Throughout	his																																																									50	Jay	Winter,	Under	the	cover	of	war:	The	Armenian	Genocide	in	the	context	of	total	
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administration,	Roosevelt	and	his	top	aides	adhered	to	a	philosophy	of	“rescue	through	victory”	that	although	it	was	more	passive	than	some	activists	may	have	hoped	for,	was	drafted	with	the	fate	of	the	Jews	in	mind.	53	Because	of	his	desire	for	reelection	Roosevelt	was	also	carefully	attuned	to	what	the	American	people	were	demanding	in	terms	of	the	Jews,	and	his	creation	of	the	War	Refugee	Board,	speaks	the	positive	effects	of	this	pragmatism.	Although	the	response	of	the	United	States	to	both	the	Ottoman	massacre	of	Armenians	and	the	Nazi	Holocaust,	proved	largely	passive,	both	responses	were	for	the	most	part	what	could	have	been	reasonably	expected	given	the	political	and	ideological	setting.	In	the	thirty	years	from	the	start	of	the	massacres	in	Armenia	to	the	fall	of	the	Nazis	in	Europe,	Americans’	concept	of	the	role	of	the	United	States	in	the	world	and	of	its	international	responsibilities	was	only	beginning	to	evolve.	Wilson,	Roosevelt	and	prominent	American	leaders	responded	to	these	changes	accordingly,	but	with	a	pragmatic	understanding	of	the	constraints	of	American	power.	With	the	exception	of	the	State	Department’s	blatant	failure	in	dealing	with	Jewish	immigration	during	World	War	II,	the	United	States	responded	to	the	best	of	its	ability	and	understanding	in	both	genocides.	While	the	temptation	to	wish	that	America	could	have	done	more	to	abate	the	catastrophes	persists,	the	American	capacity	to	intervene	in	both	instances	with	curtailed	by	ideological	constraints,	and	the	demands	of	waging	war.	Americans	proved	sympathetic	to	both	of	the	causes	and	although	they	could	not	significantly	temper	the	destruction	in	either	case	the	incidents	underscore	the	difficulty	of	humanitarian	intervention,	and	they	also																																																									53Wyman,	312	
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reinforce	the	fact	that	even	the	most	fundamental	human	rights	violations	exist	in	a	sphere	of	political	concerns.		Since	1945	much	has	changed	about	American	foreign	policy,	but	many	of	the	issues	that	complicated	American	intervention	in	Nazi	Germany	and	Ottoman	Turkey	persist.	Questions	of	states’	sovereignty	and	the	responsibilities	of	bystander	nations	muddle	humanitarian	attempts	to	intervene	on	behalf	of	oppressed	people.		In	light	of	the	recent	genocides	in	Rwanda	and	Darfur,	more	than	one	hundred	years	after	he	posed	it	to	The	New	York	Times,	Vincent	Yardum’s	question	still	rings	true:	“Is	humanity	so	situated	as	to	see	deliberate	murder	committed?	And	on	such	a	scale?”	It	will	be	the	duty	of	American	leaders	and	civilians	as	the	witnesses	of	future	genocides	to	answer	these	questions	and	to	attempt	to	close	the	frightening	gap	between	recognition	and	response.								 Works	Cited		1)	Beschloss,	Michael.	The	Conquerors:	Roosevelt,	Truman	and	the	Destruction	of	
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